GRA
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Re: Hydrogen and FCEVs discussion thread

Fri May 11, 2018 3:03 pm

Zythryn wrote:
GRA wrote:Just found this, although it dates from Feb. 11th:
PRELIMINARY REPORT
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
High-Pressure Hydrogen Gas Cylinder
Fire During Transportation
Diamond Bar, California
February 11, 2018
HMD18FR001
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/HMD18FR001-preliminary.pdf

. . . Preliminary findings from the investigation include the following:

    • The 25 aluminum-lined carbon composite gas cylinders were each 120 inches in length,
    17.8 inches in diameter, and had a nominal water capacity of 18,716 cubic inches
    (312.9 liters).

    • The cylinder module was shipped with all but one cylinder full. Each cylinder contained
    about 10.0 kg of hydrogen at a pressure of approximately 7,500 PSI gauge (psig).

    • Cylinder damage was limited to fire exposure.Twenty of the cylinders exhibited varying
    degrees of fire exposure, but none of them were breached[/b] (see Figure 2).

    • Pressure relief devices activated on 12 of the cylinders.

    • The cylinder manufacturer specifications call for type CG-5 pressure relief devices set at
    10,000 psig.1 However, NTSB investigators and investigation party members found
    pressure relief devices set at an incorrect pressure rating of 5,833 psig installed in three
    of the cylinders. Two of these under-rated pressure relief devices had activated. The
    source of the incorrect pressure relief devices is under investigation.

    • The trailer included tubing attached to each pressure relief device outlet to safely vent
    relieved gases upward to the outside top of the cylinder module. Seven of the vent tubes
    became detached from the pressure relief device assemblies and vented gas to the interior
    of the trailer, which fueled the fire. The separated tubing had not been tightly secured by
    the compression fittings.

    • The incorrectly rated pressure relief devices and unsecured vent tubing were not identified
    during the cylinder requalification inspections at FIBA Technologies Inc.

    • Responding to initial findings, Air Products inspected its remaining fleet of 13 hydrogen
    cylinder modules. One trailer undergoing qualification inspection was found to have a
    cylinder with an underrated pressure relief device. Improperly secured vent tubing was
    found in about half of all the lines inspected.

    Air Products and FIBA have revised the requalification inspection procedures to address
    fittings securement and pressure relief device compatibility
    .

Interesting how the same piece can read very different simply by changing the bolder text.

Indeed. And your point being?
Guy [I have lots of experience designing/selling off-grid AE systems, some using EVs but don't own one. Local trips are by foot, bike and/or rapid transit].

The 'best' is the enemy of 'good enough'. Copper shot, not Silver bullets.

Zythryn
Posts: 1016
Joined: Fri Jun 04, 2010 4:49 am

Re: Hydrogen and FCEVs discussion thread

Sat May 12, 2018 6:20 am

GRA wrote:...
Indeed. And your point being?


An observation and question.
Why did you bother holding any of it.
Why not draw equal attention to the entire quoted text?

Hopefully they did make appropriate changes since their certifications previously missed so much.
Previous owner of Prius, Volt, Leaf & Model S
Current owner of Model 3
http://www.netzeromn.com

GRA
Posts: 8522
Joined: Mon Sep 19, 2011 1:49 pm
Location: East side of San Francisco Bay

Re: Hydrogen and FCEVs discussion thread

Sat May 12, 2018 11:30 am

Zythryn wrote:
GRA wrote:...
Indeed. And your point being?


An observation and question.
Why did you bother holding any of it.
Why not draw equal attention to the entire quoted text?

Hopefully they did make appropriate changes since their certifications previously missed so much.

I bolded what I considered to be most relevant as far as design safety rather than human errors, which will always be with us. Safety regs are always written or modified on the basis on experience. The need for possible redesign of the relief valves so the wrong ones can't be used, and/or the inspection procedures to reduce the chances of that, will undoubtedly be addressed by the NTSB in the final report, just as recommendations were made in the earlier H2 tanker accident report about modifying the valves and protective caging on the tanks. We're talking about hazmat here; what does sometimes cheese me off here is the idea that has more than once been peddled in this thread that H2 is uniquely hazardous, or at least much more dangerous than other hazmat that we routinely haul around, store and use.

For instance, if you read the summary (or the entire report) of that earlier H2 tanker accident, it involved a collision between the tanker and an erratically driven pickup truck. The tanker rear-ended the pickup, which then departed the road and crashed. The tanker rolled over, and the drive died due to injuries sustained in the crash. Several of the tank valves at the rear of the trailer were damaged, and an H2 fire started. The fire never got to the cab, as the H2 went straight up. Is this uniquely dangerous? Let's look at what was happening elsewhere.

The driver of the pickup was seriously injured. Both drivers were eventually removed from their vehicles. However, In exiting the road, the pickup ruptured a fuel line and a gasoline fire, fed by its own fuel tank and completely separate from the H2 fire, started and destroyed it. NTSB wasn't interested in that fire, because car gasoline fires are routine and the risks and actions to be taken well known, yet both H2 and gas are flammable hazmat.
Guy [I have lots of experience designing/selling off-grid AE systems, some using EVs but don't own one. Local trips are by foot, bike and/or rapid transit].

The 'best' is the enemy of 'good enough'. Copper shot, not Silver bullets.

Zythryn
Posts: 1016
Joined: Fri Jun 04, 2010 4:49 am

Re: Hydrogen and FCEVs discussion thread

Sat May 12, 2018 3:07 pm

GRA wrote:...
I bolded what I considered to be most relevant as far as design safety rather than human errors, which will always be with us. Safety regs are always written or modified on the basis on experience. The need for possible redesign of the relief valves so the wrong ones can't be used, and/or the inspection procedures to reduce the chances of that, will undoubtedly be addressed by the NTSB in the final report, just as recommendations were made in the earlier H2 tanker accident report about modifying the valves and protective caging on the tanks. We're talking about hazmat here; what does sometimes cheese me off here is the idea that has more than once been peddled in this thread that H2 is uniquely hazardous, or at least much more dangerous than other hazmat that we routinely haul around, store and use.

For instance, if you read the summary (or the entire report) of that earlier H2 tanker accident, it involved a collision between the tanker and an erratically driven pickup truck. The tanker rear-ended the pickup, which then departed the road and crashed. The tanker rolled over, and the drive died due to injuries sustained in the crash. Several of the tank valves at the rear of the trailer were damaged, and an H2 fire started. The fire never got to the cab, as the H2 went straight up. Is this uniquely dangerous? Let's look at what was happening elsewhere.

The driver of the pickup was seriously injured. Both drivers were eventually removed from their vehicles. However, In exiting the road, the pickup ruptured a fuel line and a gasoline fire, fed by its own fuel tank and completely separate from the H2 fire, started and destroyed it. NTSB wasn't interested in that fire, because car gasoline fires are routine and the risks and actions to be taken well known, yet both H2 and gas are flammable hazmat.


The bolded is incorrect. The H2 did not go straight up, it went into the vehicle and intensified the fire.
The trailer included tubing attached to each pressure relief device outlet to safely vent
relieved gases upward to the outside top of the cylinder module. Seven of the vent tubes
became detached from the pressure relief device assemblies and vented gas to the interior
of the trailer, which fueled the fire.
The separated tubing had not been tightly secured by
the compression fittings.


Sure, perhaps not the cab, but none the less, it wasn’t vented “straight up”.

And yes, human error can certainly result in disaster in both vehicles. However, there are more places with H2 where human error can cause disaster. As evidenced in this accident.
Previous owner of Prius, Volt, Leaf & Model S
Current owner of Model 3
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GRA
Posts: 8522
Joined: Mon Sep 19, 2011 1:49 pm
Location: East side of San Francisco Bay

Re: Hydrogen and FCEVs discussion thread

Sun May 13, 2018 3:37 pm

Zythryn wrote:
GRA wrote:...
I bolded what I considered to be most relevant as far as design safety rather than human errors, which will always be with us. Safety regs are always written or modified on the basis on experience. The need for possible redesign of the relief valves so the wrong ones can't be used, and/or the inspection procedures to reduce the chances of that, will undoubtedly be addressed by the NTSB in the final report, just as recommendations were made in the earlier H2 tanker accident report about modifying the valves and protective caging on the tanks. We're talking about hazmat here; what does sometimes cheese me off here is the idea that has more than once been peddled in this thread that H2 is uniquely hazardous, or at least much more dangerous than other hazmat that we routinely haul around, store and use.

For instance, if you read the summary (or the entire report) of that earlier H2 tanker accident, it involved a collision between the tanker and an erratically driven pickup truck. The tanker rear-ended the pickup, which then departed the road and crashed. The tanker rolled over, and the drive died due to injuries sustained in the crash. Several of the tank valves at the rear of the trailer were damaged, and an H2 fire started. The fire never got to the cab, as the H2 went straight up. Is this uniquely dangerous? Let's look at what was happening elsewhere.

The driver of the pickup was seriously injured. Both drivers were eventually removed from their vehicles. However, In exiting the road, the pickup ruptured a fuel line and a gasoline fire, fed by its own fuel tank and completely separate from the H2 fire, started and destroyed it. NTSB wasn't interested in that fire, because car gasoline fires are routine and the risks and actions to be taken well known, yet both H2 and gas are flammable hazmat.


The bolded is incorrect. The H2 did not go straight up, it went into the vehicle and intensified the fire.
The trailer included tubing attached to each pressure relief device outlet to safely vent
relieved gases upward to the outside top of the cylinder module. Seven of the vent tubes
became detached from the pressure relief device assemblies and vented gas to the interior
of the trailer, which fueled the fire.
The separated tubing had not been tightly secured by
the compression fittings.


Sure, perhaps not the cab, but none the less, it wasn’t vented “straight up”.

And yes, human error can certainly result in disaster in both vehicles. However, there are more places with H2 where human error can cause disaster. As evidenced in this accident.

Immediately upon exiting the end of the tubes, the H2 went straight up. That it fed the existing fire is true, but it didn't spread horizontally (note, the trailers are open to the air, so no containment beyond the tanks and tubes applied). Whereas gasoline might have leaked and pooled under the trailer, or run downhill first before igniting, spreading the fire over a wider area.

How do you figure there are more places with H2 where human error can cause disaster? There've certainly been no shortage of gasoline fires through human error or stupidity - you'd think there wouldn't need to be signs at gas pumps saying "No Smoking", but there are, not to mention break-away connections on filling hoses and numerous other measures and regulations all based on past experience of human error/stupidity. Even so, no one in their right mind would consider gasoline inherently safe. Diesel's a lot safer than gas, but it can cause a conflagration too given the right conditions. The main difference between the risks of these and the risks of something like H2 is a century of familiarity.
Last edited by GRA on Sun May 13, 2018 4:26 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Guy [I have lots of experience designing/selling off-grid AE systems, some using EVs but don't own one. Local trips are by foot, bike and/or rapid transit].

The 'best' is the enemy of 'good enough'. Copper shot, not Silver bullets.

Zythryn
Posts: 1016
Joined: Fri Jun 04, 2010 4:49 am

Re: Hydrogen and FCEVs discussion thread

Sun May 13, 2018 4:24 pm

My biggest concern is the storage and delivery while under such high pressures.
This is the area where human error can cause issue where the same errors would not be so hazardous with gasoline.
Previous owner of Prius, Volt, Leaf & Model S
Current owner of Model 3
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GRA
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Joined: Mon Sep 19, 2011 1:49 pm
Location: East side of San Francisco Bay

Re: Hydrogen and FCEVs discussion thread

Sun May 13, 2018 4:33 pm

Zythryn wrote:My biggest concern is the storage and delivery while under such high pressures.
This is the area where human error can cause issue where the same errors would not be so hazardous with gasoline.

That is certainly a higher risk factor, but it may well be more than balanced out by the lower risk factors due to being lighter than air, an inability to pool and rapid dispersal. Only large scale use will show whether overall it is or not. Of course, it would be safer to use much lower pressure transit and storage via adsorption or nano-tubes, and much research is being undertaken in both areas. There have seen some indications recently that at least one company is close to commercialization of the latter.
Guy [I have lots of experience designing/selling off-grid AE systems, some using EVs but don't own one. Local trips are by foot, bike and/or rapid transit].

The 'best' is the enemy of 'good enough'. Copper shot, not Silver bullets.

GRA
Posts: 8522
Joined: Mon Sep 19, 2011 1:49 pm
Location: East side of San Francisco Bay

Re: Hydrogen and FCEVs discussion thread

Sun May 13, 2018 4:42 pm

Via GCC:
German power-to-gas facility opens green methanation plant; €28M STORE&GO project
http://www.greencarcongress.com/2018/05/20180513-falkenhagen.html

Construction on the methanation plant began in July 2017. While the current facility feeds pure hydrogen (“WindGas”) directly into the gas grid, the new methanation plant provides for the generation of “green” methane.

In this second stage, hydrogen from regenerative energy sources is converted into methane (CH4), i.e. synthetic natural gas, using CO2 from a bio-ethanol plant. This constitutes an important contribution to the success of the energy transition, because green methane, in contrast to green hydrogen, can be used in a wider variety of ways.

It can be made available to a variety of markets, such as the manufacturing sector, the electricity, and heating market as well as the mobility sector. Moreover, it provides for unrestricted use of the natural gas infrastructure, including for transport and storage. This stored energy is then available as backup whenever there is an insufficient supply of solar and wind power. . . .

The wind-to-gas pilot plant “WindGas Falkenhagen” was constructed in 2013 to store wind energy in the natural gas grid. The cornerstone for the methanation plant was laid in July 2017, and additional essential components were put in place directly alongside the existing facility. All work was completed on schedule.

The methanation plant produces up to 57 m3/h of SNG (synthetic natural gas, at normal pressure and temperature), which equates to an output of 600 kWh/h. The heat generated by the process is used by a nearby veneer plant. . . .

STORE&GO focuses on the integration of PtG into the daily operation of European energy grids to investigate the maturity level of the technology. Three different demonstration sites—Falkenhagen, Troia (Italy), and Solothurn (Switzerland) offer highly diverse testing grounds for PtG:

    Available energy sources (high wind power; PV and hydro; PV and wind power)

    Local consumers (low consumption; municipal region; rural area)

    Electricity grid type (transmission grid; municipal distribution grid; regional distribution grid)

    Gas grid type (long distance transport; municipal distribution grid; regional distribution grid)

    Type of CO2 source (biogas; waste water; atmosphere)

    Heat integration (veneer mill; district heating; CO2 enrichment)

Moreover, three different innovative methanation processes will be developed and improved from Technology Readiness Level 5 (TRL) close to maturity (TRL 6–7):

    Catalytic honeycomb/structured wall methanation reactors

    Biological methanation

    Modular milli-structured catalytic methanation reactors
Guy [I have lots of experience designing/selling off-grid AE systems, some using EVs but don't own one. Local trips are by foot, bike and/or rapid transit].

The 'best' is the enemy of 'good enough'. Copper shot, not Silver bullets.

edatoakrun
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Re: Hydrogen and FCEVs discussion thread

Sun May 13, 2018 5:48 pm

GRA wrote:Via GCC:
German power-to-gas facility opens green methanation plant; €28M STORE&GO project
http://www.greencarcongress.com/2018/05/20180513-falkenhagen.html

Construction on the methanation plant began in July 2017. While the current facility feeds pure hydrogen (“WindGas”) directly into the gas grid, the new methanation plant provides for the generation of “green” methane.

In this second stage, hydrogen from regenerative energy sources is converted into methane (CH4), i.e. synthetic natural gas...

And the reason you posted this on the Hydrogen and FCEVs discussion thread, is to assure us that we now have a pathway to transform fuel cell hydrogen supplies-nearly all of which are derived from methane in an expensive and inefficient process-back into methane in another expensive and inefficient conversion?
no condition is permanent

GRA
Posts: 8522
Joined: Mon Sep 19, 2011 1:49 pm
Location: East side of San Francisco Bay

Re: Hydrogen and FCEVs discussion thread

Mon May 14, 2018 4:17 pm

edatoakrun wrote:
GRA wrote:Via GCC:
German power-to-gas facility opens green methanation plant; €28M STORE&GO project
http://www.greencarcongress.com/2018/05/20180513-falkenhagen.html

Construction on the methanation plant began in July 2017. While the current facility feeds pure hydrogen (“WindGas”) directly into the gas grid, the new methanation plant provides for the generation of “green” methane.

In this second stage, hydrogen from regenerative energy sources is converted into methane (CH4), i.e. synthetic natural gas...

And the reason you posted this on the Hydrogen and FCEVs discussion thread, is to assure us that we now have a pathway to transform fuel cell hydrogen supplies-nearly all of which are derived from methane in an expensive and inefficient process-back into methane in another expensive and inefficient conversion?

Because it involves renewable H2 and power to gas, of course, which can be used in a variety of ways. If you don't find it germane, feel free to ignore it.
Guy [I have lots of experience designing/selling off-grid AE systems, some using EVs but don't own one. Local trips are by foot, bike and/or rapid transit].

The 'best' is the enemy of 'good enough'. Copper shot, not Silver bullets.

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